Using a nationally representative sample of 12,344 immigrants from 41 different countries of ancestry living in Spain in 2007, we find that the higher the housing-loan penetration in the country of ancestry, the higher the likelihood of having a mortgage in Spain. Similarly, the higher the mortgage depth in the country of ancestry, the higher the present value of the monthly mortgage payments. Our results suggest that social norms regarding mortgage finance in the country of ancestry matter in determining immigrants' mortgage finance in the host country. More specifically, the effect of social norms on the decision to have a mortgage (the extensive margin) and the amount of the mortgage payments (the intensive margin) is about one third and tenth the size of the effect of having a college degree on mortgage debt, respectively. Evidence of strong persistence of culture among those with longer tenure in the host country, those who immigrated as children or young adults, and second-generation immigrants suggests that vertical transmission of beliefs (from parents to children) is a plausible channel of transmission. Perhaps most importantly, we find that cultural attitudes regarding property rights are most relevant when explaining individuals' decision to get a mortgage, but those regarding credit information matter most when explaining the amount of the mortgage debt.
Introduction
Because average home prices range from 4 times the annual income in developed countries to 8 times in emerging countries (Ball, 2003) , mortgage debt is a key element to homeownership.
Nonetheless, both the mortgage-acquisition decision (extensive margin) and the amount-of mortgage-debt decision (intensive margin) vary widely across countries, as the housing-loan penetration (the percentage of adult population with an outstanding loan to purchase a home) varies from 0.4% in Nicaragua to close to 60% in Sweden, and the mortgage depth (the mortgage debt relative to the GDP) varies from 0.5% in Ghana to 83% in The Netherlands. 1 Given the positive socio-economic effects of homeownership (Dietz and Haurin, 2003; and Inter-American Development Bank, 2012) , and the relevance of mortgage debt in accessing adequate housing, in addition to the macroeconomic consequences of mortgage debt (Claessens et al., 2011) , understanding the demand for mortgage debt is of fundamental importance.
Thus far, studies using data at the individual level have focused on the effects of inflation, tax treatment on mortgages, legal and economic institutions, bankruptcy exemptions, reposition periods, income, wealth, age, education, and household composition on the propensity to acquire a mortgage or the amount of mortgage debt borrowed. 2, 3 Recently, the economic psychology literature has also explored the role of emotional factors in determining the decision to acquire a mortgage, finding no effect of impulsivity on mortgage demand (Ottaviani and Vandone, 2011) . 4 Moving to studies using aggregate data, Stulz and Williamson (2003) find that debt markets and banking development is correlated with culture (proxied by religion and language) exploiting variation across 48 countries. Other aggregate-data studies have focused on identifying which factors are associated with cross-country variation of mortgage debt or with a well-functioning housing-finance system (see Warnock and Warnock, 2008; and Badev et al., 2014 , and literature reviews within). Nonetheless, most of these aggregate-data studies capture correlations, rather than causal inference. Moreover, they focus on the effects of formal institutional constraints, such as the countries' legal rights for 1 See columns 3 and 4 in Table 2 .A. 2 See Miles (1994) and Leece (2004) for studies on the effect of inflation on mortgage demand, Jappelli and Pistaferri (2007) , and the literature within, for studies on the effect of tax treatment on mortgages, Bover et al. (forthcoming) for an analysis of legal and economic institutions on mortgage debt in 11 EU countries, Gropp et al. (1997) on the effect of bankruptcy exemptions on mortgage debt, Fabbri and Padula (2004) on the effect of the time to repossess a house on mortgages, and Cox and Jappelli (1993) , Duca and Rosenthal (1993) , Gropp et al. (1997) , Crook (2001) , Magri (2002) , Fabbri and Padula (2004) , and Bover et al. (forthcoming) , among others, on the effects of income, wealth, age, education and household composition on the demand for mortgages. 3 A related literature, also using individual micro-data, studies the impact of mortgage-lending constraints on female labor supply (Fortin, 1995) , household consumption (Masier and Villanueva, 2011) , or homeownership (Feldman, 2001; and Rosenthal, 2002; and Barakova et al., 2003) . 4 In contrast, the authors find evidence that impulsivity is associated with unsecured debt, that is, consumer credit. borrowers and lenders, and the amount and quality of credit information; as opposed to informal institutional constraints (or culture or social norms), defined as "beliefs and preferences that vary systematically across groups of individuals separated by space (either geographic or social) or time" (Fernández, 2008) . The objective of the current paper is to understand the role of informal institutional constraints (culture or social norms) apart from environmental factors (or formal economic and institutional constraints) in explaining individuals' decision to get a mortgage and the amount borrowed. We focus on the slowmoving components of culture (linked to religion and ethnicity) as opposed to the fast-moving ones (Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales, 2006 , for conceptual framework on culture).
While others have found that culture affects economic behavior, this paper is the first to provide evidence that cultural attitudes affect financial liabilities, and that they do so both at the extensive and intensive margins. 5 We follow Fernandez and Fogli (2006), Fernandez (2007) , and Fernandez (2009) , and use, as measure of cultural attitudes regarding mortgage debt, the country-of-ancestry outcome of interest obtained from several sources (as described in Appendix Table A.1) . More specifically, we use the housing-loan penetration (the percentage of adult population with an outstanding loan to purchase a home) in the country-of-ancestry as capturing social norms regarding the demand for mortgages, and the country-ancestry mortgage depth (the mortgage debt relative to the GDP) as capturing social norms regarding the amount of mortgage borrowed. 6 We then merge this relatively novel mortgage-debt country-of-ancestry data with a nationally representative survey of 12,344 immigrants from 41 different countries living in Spain in 2007 (the 2007
Encuesta Nacional de Immigrantes, ENI hereafter). Perhaps most importantly, we find that cultural attitudes regarding property rights are most relevant when explaining individuals' 5 Other authors have used a similar approach to estimate the effects of culture on different socio-economic outcomes, including savings rates (Carroll, Rhee, and Rhee 1994) ; stock market participation (Osili and Paulson, 2008) ; preferences for redistribution (Luttmer and Singhal, 2011) ; fertility and female labor force participation (Antecol 2000; Fogli 2006, 2009; Fernández 2007) ; living arrangements (Giuliano 2007) , the demand for social insurance (Eugster et al. 2011 ); preferences for a child's sex (Almond, Edlund, and Milligan 2013) ; divorce (Furtado, Marcén, and Sevilla 2013) ; math gender gap (Nollenberger, Rodríguez-Planas, and Sevilla, 2016) ; and smoking gender gap (Rodríguez-Planas and Sanz-de-Galdeano, 2016) . A complementary approach is that of Haliassos et al., 2016 , which use genetic distance and responses to the Hofstede culturerelevant questions to classify culture and find evidence of cultural differences in financial behavior across European countries.
To the best of our knowledge, no one has studied whether culture explains the demand for of mortgage debt. 6 Fernandez (2007) , Fernandez and Fogli (2006) and Fernandez (2009) use country-of-ancestry female labor force participation (the first), fertility rate (the second) and both female labor force participation and fertility rate (the third) as proxies of culture. Their outcome of interest is females' labor force participation and/or fertility decisions.
decision to get a mortgage, but those regarding credit information matter most when explaining the amount of the mortgage debt, providing insightful information for policy makers.
By focusing on immigrants living in the same host country, we are holding constant the host country's labor market and economic institutions and conditions, housing laws and regulations, legal rights for borrowers and lenders, the amount and quality of credit information available to lenders, as well as the weather and geography. If only current formal institutional constraints determine access to and the amount of mortgage individuals get, the housing-loan penetration (the percentage of adult population with an outstanding loan to purchase a home) and the mortgage depth (the mortgage debt relative to the GDP) of the country of ancestry should not matter. Evidence that country-of-ancestry housing-loan penetration and mortgage depth affect immigrants' likelihood of having a mortgage and the mortgage amount, respectively, in the host country would provide strong evidence that cultural values (such as conventions and rules of behavior regarding mortgage finance) from immigrants' country of ancestry matter.
We find that the higher the housing-loan penetration in the country of ancestry, the higher the likelihood of having a mortgage in the host country. Similarly, we find that the higher the mortgage depth in the country of ancestry, the higher the present value of the mortgage payments. Our main results, summarized in Figures 1 and 2 , are confirmed in the regression analyses, which include a large and rich set of economic and demographic characteristics known to affect mortgage debt, such as individual's education, family composition, earnings, and wealth, among others, and are robust to a battery of sensitivity analyses.
According to our estimates, if an individual from a country with "average" housingloan penetration had instead come from a country with housing-loan penetration one-standard deviation above the mean, the likelihood that she has a mortgage in the host country would have increased by 3.21 percentage points, a 17% increase in the likelihood of having a mortgage, relative to the observed mortgage-access rates for immigrants of 19%. Similarly, if an individual from a country with "average" mortgage depth had instead come from a country with mortgage depth one-standard deviation above the mean, the present value of her monthly mortgage in the host country would have increased by 158.87 euros, a 9% increase in the present value monthly mortgage, relative to the observed average of 1,838.86 euros for immigrants. Both estimates are statistically significant at the 1 percent level. To put these estimates into context, getting a university degree is associated with a 61% (or 11.52 percentage points) and 72% (or 1,316.46 euros) increase in the likelihood of having a mortgage and the present value of the monthly mortgage payments, respectively. To put it differently, the effect of culture on the extensive and intensive margins is about one third and one tenth the effect of having a college degree on mortgage debt, respectively. Our results are robust to different specification strategies, selective migration, omitted variable bias, alternative measures of culture, and changes in sample criteria.
Our heterogeneity analysis reveals that the effects are stronger among immigrants who have been in the host country for at most ten years, as well as those who arrived to the host country after the age of 25 years old. Nonetheless, we also find evidence of strong persistence of culture among those with longer tenure in the host country, those who immigrated as children or young adults, and second-generation immigrants (that is, those who were born in Spain to immigrant parents), suggesting that vertical transmission of beliefs (from parents to children) is a plausible channel of transmission.
Our work contributes to the literature on culture and financial decisions in two distinct and important ways. First, we study the decision to acquire debt as opposed to that of owing financial assets (Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales, 2003 and 2004; Osili and Paulson, 2008) .
Second, to the best of our knowledge, we are the first to study the effect of culture on financial decisions at both the extensive and intensive margins, providing interesting insights for policy makers. 7
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the Spanish mortgage market and immigrants' access to mortgage debt. Sections 3 and 4 describe the empirical strategy and data, respectively. Sections 4 and 5 present the main results and sensitivity analysis, respectively. Sections 6 presents heterogeneity analysis and Section 7 concludes.
The Spanish Mortgage Market and Immigrants Access to Mortgages
The Spanish Mortgage Market
With the arrival of democracy in the mid-1970s, the European Union integration in the mid1980s, and the incorporation into the European Monetary Union in the 1990s, Spain underwent radical economic changes, which improved economic confidence and lowered interest rates.
7 Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2003 and 2004) and Osili and Paulson (2008) examine the effect of culture only on the decision to own stocks, not the amount of the investment. Seto and Bogan (2012) find significant variation by country-of-ancestry in the immigrant rates of holding stocks, mutual funds, and US saving bonds. In their appendix, they also present results for the intensive margin.
Easy access to global liquidity boosted corporate investment and employment, increasing household incomes and the demand for housing and mortgage debt (Henn et al., 2009) .
Since the 1950s, the Spanish government had promoted homeownership through generous subsidies and tax incentives, resulting in more than 80% of the households being owner-occupied (Leal, 2005) . This form of occupancy has remained widespread across regions and socio-economic groups in Spain up until today (Leal, 2005) , partly because of the lack of public housing stock and the small and deficient rental market (Pareja-Eastaway and San Martin, 1999 (Masier and Villanueva, 2011) , making mortgages considerably more affordable. Masier and Villanueva (2011) estimate that a 10-year increase in the maturity of the loan alone would have reduced the yearly mortgage payments for the median gross household income by 9% of the yearly net earnings. 8 At the same time, the down-payment requirements also loosened as the average loan-to-value ratio increased from 75% for mortgages signed between 1991 to 1995, to 91% for loans signed after 2003 (Masier and Villanueva, 2011) .
In addition to the liberalization of the mortgage market, real mortgage rates in Spain were around zero as most mortgages are indexed to the 120-month Euribor, and the Euribor hovered around 2% while Spain had a persistent positive inflation differential of ½ to 1 percentage points with its Euro partners (Henn et al., 2009) . On top of the low real interest rates, the generous income tax deductions for mortgage payments also lowered the user cost of house ownership (Henn et al., 2009 ). 9 As a result, households' willingness to take on mortgage debt quickly rose with mortgages representing from 40% of disposable income in 2000 to 92%
in 2007 (Henn et al., 2009 ).
The increased housing demand coupled with the underdeveloped rental market, the deregulation of the mortgage industry and the low interest rates further boosted the demand for housing developing a housing bubble, with housing prices increasing 175% between 1998 and 2008 (Gonzalez and Ortega, 2013) . In contrast with the US, mortgages in Spain are collateralized by the property and income of the mortgagee. This, added to: (1) the illusion that the entry in the European Monetary System had changed the paradigm and brought about indefinite nominal stability, (2) lenders and borrowers' myopia in anticipating a downturn and a fall in housing prices, and (3) high competition in the lending industry, led financial institutions to offer mortgages generously and to dramatically lower their credit standards (Diaz-Serrano and Raya, 2014) . According to Diaz-Serrano and Raya, 2014: "In 2002, 98% of the surveyed individual who applied for a mortgage in Spain were granted one, while in 2005, this percentage was 100%." 10 8 They assume constant installments on a 90,000 euro mortgage in 1995 at 4% interest rate, gross household income of 31,000 euro, and marginal income tax rate of 25%. The change is the term of the maturity, from 15 to 25 years. 9 Income tax relief is available for both principal and interest payments. The general deduction rate is 15% with a maximum deduction of about 9,000 euros per year. The deduction also applies for 4-year deposits into savings accounts for home purchase (OECD, 2007 (in 1991, 1996, 2000, 2001, and 2005) , which granted them with legal residence. Following the amnesties, the number of family-reunification requests also rose, increasing subsequently the demand for dwellings (Vono-de-Vilhena and BayonaCarrasco, 2012) . As immigration in Spain is labor-based (Fernández and Ortega, 2008) , immigrants were quick to find jobs in the thriving economy. Their employment rate was more than 10 percentage points higher than that of natives (Nollenberger and Rodriguez-Planas, 2016) , and estimates reveal that immigrants were responsible for 20% to 25% of the gains in the Spanish GDP per capita (Bank of Spain, 2006) .
The immigration boom further accelerated the housing demand as immigrants also entered the real-estate market (Henn et al., 2009; and Gonzalez and Ortega, 2013) . As explained by Vono-de-Vilhena and Bayona-Carrasco (2012), just as homeownership was viewed as the best option and the leading choice among Spanish young people seeking a first dwelling in Spain, it was also an important goal for immigrants. Indeed, the Spanish residential system strongly encouraged immigrants to reproduce natives' homeownership behavior (Modenes and Bayona, 2008) . Pareja-Eastaway (2009) explains that the preference for ownership among immigrants in Spain is explained by "low interest rates and high rents, a continued period of economic expansion, the scarcity and bad quality of rented dwellings, and expectation of increases in the value of the acquired dwellings." Leal and Dominguez (2008) also explain that high numbers of migrants from developing countries contributed to the exhaustion of the small rental market, putting more pressure on the housing market as a whole, thus leading to an increase in the construction of housing units in areas with a larger immigrant population. Garcia (2014) adds that "apart from immigrant workers and their families, other groups of foreigners found their niche in Spain, from Northern European pensioners (particularly British and German, but also other Europeans) to a more heterogeneous group of residents working or studying in cities." Indeed, Gonzalez and Ortega (2013) As explained by Amuedo-Dorantes and Mundra (2013), not only the documents required to acquire a mortgage were the same for immigrants than natives, access to a mortgage was as easy for immigrants as natives. 12 In fact, many banks in Spain (such as Santander Central Hispano, Bankinter, Caja Madrid, among others) facilitated access to mortgage finance to immigrants by offering them language support, personalized customer services, and efficient online banking. This easy access is well reflected by the amount of the mortgage, the loan term and the loan-to-value ratio, which were, on average, more generous for immigrants than for natives. According to Garcia and Raya (2007) , during the first half of 2007, immigrants' average mortgage in Spain was 15% higher than those of natives (which averaged 180,000
Euros). Similarly, the term of the loan was a couple of years longer than the average loan term among the native population (which averaged 35.5 years), and represented between 85% and 90% of the loan-to-value ratio (compared to an average of 83% for natives).
Diaz-Serrano and Raya (2014) explain that the expansion of the lending industry also lowered the credit standards for immigrant borrowers. These authors explain that "during the first decade of this century, it was not unusual for a significant amount of borrowers to devote almost two-thirds of their monthly earnings to paying their mortgage, hold a mortgage with a loan-to-value above 100% or be granted a mortgage despite an unstable job situation." Diaz- Serrano and Raya (2014) show that, instead of restraining immigrants' credit, lenders in Spain 12 There are no restriction on property ownership by foreigners in Spain.
charged non-EU immigrants an average of 18 basis points more in their mortgages than their native counterparts. As these authors explain, this differential is relatively small compared to the 70 basis points observed in small-firm Italian loans (Albaretto and Mistrulli, 2011) or the 50 to 100 basis points observed across races in the US (Blanchflower et al., 2003) . Perhaps most importantly for our study, Serrano and Raya (2014) did not find that there was a differential treatment among lenders by immigrants' continent of origin after holding other socio-demographic characteristics constant.
Empirical Strategy
To analyze the effect of culture on mortgage debt, we use epidemiological approach, which isolates the effect of culture from those of contemporaneous economic conditions and institutional factors by focusing on immigrants living in the same host country, and estimates whether their country-of-ancestry housing-loan penetration and mortgage depth affect immigrants' decision to have a mortgage and the amount of the mortgage debt in the host country, respectively.
As we have information on both mortgage acquisition and amount of mortgage debt, and because the decision to get a mortgage is heavily intertwined with the amount of mortgage debt to acquire, we jointly model both decisions by estimating the following Zellner's simultaneously unrelated regression model (SUR):
where is a dummy variable equal to 1 if individual from country-of-ancestry living in province has a mortgage in Spain in 2007 and 0 otherwise; is a continuous variable calculating the 2007 present value of the mortgage for individual from country-of-ancestry living in province based on the loan term, the year of purchase and the prevailing interest rate on the mortgage during that year. The vector includes a set of individual characteristics that may affect the demand for mortgages for reasons unrelated to culture, and that vary with the specification considered (as explained in Section 5 below). are a set of country-of-ancestry measures such as the literacy rate, the GDP per capita (in logarithms), the GINI coefficient, continent and religion controls, and a dummy for whether Spanish is the official language in the country of ancestry. is not present in the specifications from our main analysis (Section 5), but it is used in the sensitivity analysis (Section 6) instead.
A common concern within the epidemiological approach is that immigrants may "selfselect" in some areas in a given country. To address concerns that immigrants from different countries are living in very different regions of Spain, leading to differences in access to mortgage finance, we use fine geographical controls, namely province-of-residence fixed effects (λ and λ ). Moreover, the use of province-of-residence fixed effects is important as it implies that our identification strategy relies on comparing the mortgage-debt choices of immigrants from different countries of ancestry holding constant the province of residence.
This implies that differences across provinces in the housing and mortgage demand and Our coefficients of interest are those on the average level of housing-loan penetration and mortgage depth in the country of ancestry, namely , and , which capture the role of social norms regarding mortgage debt in explaining immigrants' demand for mortgage debt in the host country. Positive and statistically significant coefficients would suggest that coming from a country with higher housing-loan penetration and mortgage debt is associated with a higher likelihood of acquiring a mortgage and a higher amount of mortgage debt in Spain. Thus, the demand for mortgage debt for immigrants from a country with higher demand of mortgage debt (higher and ℎ ) would be higher than that of immigrants from a country of ancestry with lower demand (lower and ℎ ).
In Section II, we explained that lenders in Spain offered mortgages generously and dramatically lowered their credit standards. Perhaps more relevant to our analysis, contract conditions offered to immigrants were not correlated with country-of-ancestry after holding socio-demographic characteristics constant (Serrano and Raya, 2014) . Hence, as long as we assume that contract conditions in Spain were not correlated with country-of-ancestry mortgage depth or loan penetration, our estimates can be interpreted as demand-side effects.
Note that evidence that immigrants in Spain are discriminated against natives (as Serrano and Raya, 2014, find) is not a problem for our identification strategy as long as discrimination is constant across countries of ancestry, and hence, independent of the country of ancestry once we condition on income, age, family structure and the other socio-demographic controls in
, which is what Serrano and Raya (2014) find. Finally, in Section 6, we present sensitivity analysis showing that our results are not driven by lenders in Spain discriminating immigrants by country of ancestry.
Data

Encuesta Nacional de Immigrantes (ENI)
Our main data set is the Encuesta Nacional de Immigrantes (ENI) data, which is a one-time To be eligible to participate in the survey, the respondent has to be an immigrant who is at least 16 years old, and lives in Spain for at least one year, or if less than one year, the immigrant has to claim intention to stay in the country for at least one year. The ENI provides information about the immigrants' socio-economic background, including age, sex, country of ancestry, marital status, number of children living in the household, highest education level completed, current province of residence, employment status, monthly earnings, euro amount of remittances sent to the country of ancestry, Spanish fluency, homeownership in Spain and in the country of ancestry before he or she emigrated, and legal immigration status. In addition, the ENI also has information on mortgage debt. More specifically, the immigrant is asked whether he or she holds a mortgage in 2007, the monthly payments, the term of the loan, and the year the house was bought. With this information, we estimate the present value of the monthly mortgage payments (PV, hereafter) as follows:
where Payment is the monthly mortgage payment, r is the mortgage interest rate and lt is the full loan term. As data on mortgage interest rates are not available in the ENI dataset, we collected it from Bank of Spain and matched it to the individual data based on the year the house was purchased and the term of the loan, which were both available in the ENI. Table 1 displays the summary statistics for the variables from the ENI dataset for our final sample. The first two rows present the key outcome variables, namely the percent with a mortgage and the present value of the mortgage at survey date. We observe that 19% of our sample are paying off their home mortgage at survey date, and their average present value of monthly mortgage is 1,839 euros. The following rows, which were used to estimate the present value of monthly mortgage, show that the average monthly mortgage payment is 631 euros, the median loan term is 25 years, and the median year of purchase was 2002 (the average loan term and year of purchase are 25 years and 1998, respectively).
Moving now to immigrants' socio-demographic characteristics, we observe that about half of our sample (52%) are males, a similar proportion are married, and about 57% have minor children living with them in the household. In terms of education, more than half of our sample has completed secondary education (equivalent to a high-school degree), and close to one fifth has a university degree. Less than a tenth of immigrants in our sample (7%) report not being fluent in Spanish. Close to two thirds of our sample reports working, and their average monthly earnings are 706 euros. Among those reporting having a mortgage, 76.4% of them work, and their monthly earnings are 1,026 euros. About two fifths of our sample sends remittances to their home country, and the average monthly remittance is 615 euros. Close to one third of our sample owned a home in the country of ancestry prior to emigrating.
Most of the immigrants in our sample (89%) are foreign born, also known as firstgeneration immigrants. Second-generation immigrants are those born in Spain to at least one foreign-born parent. Two fifths of our sample of immigrants comes from Europe, another two fifths come from Latin America, 15% come from Africa, and close to 4% from Asia. The median (average) immigrant in our sample is 38 (41) years old, has migrated at the age of 26 (26), and has been in Spain for approximately 7 (15) years. More than one quarter of our sample (27%) are naturalized, and 13% are permanent residents. Another third holds some type of temporary residency status (29% with temporary residency card and 4% with a conditional residence permit). About 9% of the sample report not having legal documents to live in Spain. Our results are robust to restricting the analysis to those who are naturalized citizens or permanent residents as shown in Section 7.
Country-of-Ancestry Data
To proxy social norms regarding mortgage debt, we focus on two main country-of-ancestry variables: the housing-loan penetration, and the mortgage depth.
The housing-loan penetration is defined as the percentage of adult population with an outstanding loan to purchase a home, and it comes from Table A The mortgage depth is defined as the ratio of the mortgage debt to the Gross Domestic Product (GDP), and it has been collected from difference sources. Most of the mortgage depth information in our data set comes from indicator "only captures formal mortgage loans from regulated financial institutions and excludes loans from non-regulated microfinance institutions and informal sources. Similarly, it excludes loans or grants from government organizations outside the regulated financial system."
Because of data limitations, we use measures of these two variables collected after the turn of the century-as opposed to when individuals (or their parents) emigrated. It is important to highlight that the use of contemporaneous measures is a common practice in the literature (Giuliano, 2007; Fernández and Fogli, 2009; Furtado, Marcen and Sevilla, 2013; and Nollenberger, Rodriguez-Planas, Sevilla, 2016; among others) . A frequent argument in favor of such practice is that countries' aggregated social norms change slowly over time. Most importantly, we also collected a range of additional country-of-ancestry level variables to conduct sensitivity analysis and, hence, test the relevance of alternative hypotheses.
Definitions and data sources for these country-of-ancestry variables are shown in Appendix 
Sample Selection and Country-of-Ancestry Descriptive Statistics
While some studies using the epidemiological approach only use second-generation immigrants (Fernandez and Fogli, 2006; Giuliano, 2007; and Nollenberger, Rodriguez-Planas, Sevilla, 2016) , others study the behavior of the immigrants themselves (Carroll, Rhee and Rhee, 1994; and Furtado, Marcen, and Sevilla, 2013) or both first-and second-generation immigrants (Osili and Paulson, 2008; and Luttmer and Singhal, 2011) . To maximize the size of our sample (second-generation immigrants represent 11% of our sample or 1,941 individuals), our main analysis is done using both first-and second-generation immigrants.
Heterogeneity analysis in Section 7 shows that results hold separately for both groups of immigrants.
We restrict our sample to immigrants who are at least 18 years of age and live in one of the 52 Spanish provinces. In addition, as we merge ENI individual data to country-of-ancestry data, we restrict our sample to those individuals for whom we observe housing-loan penetration and mortgage depth in their country of ancestry. 15 ENI individual data is merged to country-of-ancestry data using the first-generation immigrants' reported country of birth. For secondgeneration immigrants, we assign their mother's country of birth if she was born outside of Spain herself and information on her country of birth was available. Otherwise, we assign their father's country of birth if he was born outside of Spain himself and information on his country of birth information is available. 16 Following a standard practice in the epidemiological approach, we also drop immigrants whose country of ancestry has fewer than 15 observations. 17
In Section 6, we explore the robustness of our results to changes in sample criteria.
Our final sample has 12,344 immigrants from 41 different countries of ancestry (as shown in Table 2 Ukraine (206 observations) because country-of-ancestry mortgage depth is missing. We also lose Norway (22 observations) and Switzerland (154 observations) because housing-loan penetration is missing. 16 For those second-generation immigrants who reported that both parents were born in Spain (319 observations or 1.7% of our sample after adjusting with population weights) or for whom information on both parents' country of birth was missing (219 observations or 0.9% of our sample after adjusting with population weights), we assigned Spain as their country of ancestry. Our results are robust to excluding them from the analysis (as shown in Section 6). Some of the additional characteristics that we will sequentially include (such as, for instance, family structure, education, work status, income, or the amount of remittances sent to the home country) may well be affected by financial social norms. Therefore, by including them, we are testing whether social norms about mortgage debt have a direct impact on the mortgage demand beyond the indirect ways in which they could affect such demand through these other variables. To put it differently, by including some of these additional controls we are limiting the avenues through which culture is allowed to operate. While this may well be a very demanding test of the relevance of culture, it is important to assess the sensitivity of our results to the inclusion of additional variables to the extent that they may capture underlying socioeconomic and behavioral differences across individuals rather than culture.
Focusing first on Row 1, Columns 1 to 3 in Tables 3.A and 3 .B, we observe that all coefficients of interest, α2 and , are positive and statistically significant at the 1 percent level, highlighting the relevance of country-of-origin social norms on mortgage debt in explaining the demand for mortgage in the host country. Moving from Column 1 to 3 has little effect on α2, and reduces the size of a tad, suggesting that not controlling for these socio-economic differences over-estimates the true effect of culture on the present value of monthly mortgage payments by 138 euros (or 15%). 19 Based on estimates from Column 3, if an individual from a country with "average" housing-loan penetration had instead come from a country with a housing-loan penetration To put these estimates into context, getting a university degree is associated with a 61%
(or 11.52 percentage points) and 72% (or 1,316.46 euros) increase in the likelihood of having a mortgage and the present value of the monthly mortgage payments, respectively. Hence, the effect of culture on the extensive and intensive margins is about one third and one tenth the effect of having a college degree on mortgage debt, respectively.
Notice that all of the explanatory variables sequentially added in Columns 1 to 3 behave according to expectations. Being older, married, or having children increases both the likelihood of having a mortgage and its present value. Similarly, higher education or earnings increase the demand for mortgage debt, but lack of Spanish fluency decreases it. 19 We follow papers that use both first-and second-immigrants (Osili and Paulson, 2008; and Luttmer and Singhal, 2011) and do not use tenure in Spain as a right-hand-side control. Adding this years in Spain as an additional control to the main specification does not affect them main results. In particular, As immigration status affects the decision to become a homeowner (Amuedo-Dorantes and Mundra, 2013), it is likely that it also affect the demand for mortgages. Immigration status may also vary systematically across countries of ancestry. If so, not controlling for it would bias our culture estimates. Column 4 controls for immigrants' legal status in the host country.
Interestingly, we find that not controlling for immigration status over-estimates the effect of culture on the likelihood of having a mortgage by 7 percentage points (or 30%), and the present value of the monthly mortgage by 211 euros (or 28%). Nonetheless, and remain positive and statistically significant at the 1 percent level, suggesting that culture continues to be associated with the demand for mortgages.
If immigrants from countries with an under-developed housing finance system are not demanding mortgages in Spain because they are investing in their country of ancestry through remittances, not controlling for individuals' remittances would again lead to omitted variable bias. Column 5 controls for whether the individual sends remittances to the country of ancestry and the monthly amount (in euros). As expected, sending remittances and their amount are inversely related to the likelihood of having a mortgage in the host country. Similarly, the higher the remittance amount the lower the present value of the mortgage (although sending remittances is directly related with the amount of the mortgage). Most importantly, comparing estimates of and from Columns 4 and 5 reveals only small differences in the size of the coefficients. 23 Note that if we use estimates from Column 5 instead of our baseline specification, we find that a one-standard deviation increase in the country-of-ancestry housing-loan penetration (or mortgage depth) is associated with an increase in the likelihood that the immigrant has a mortgage (or the present value of the mortgage) in the host country by 2.09 percentage points, an 11% increase (or 118.19 percentage points, an 6.4% increase). Both estimates are statistically significant at the 1 percent level. In comparison, the effect of having a college degree on mortgage financing is now associated with an increase of 9.81 percentage points in the likelihood of having a mortgage and of 1,294 euros in monthly payment. Hence, according to estimates in Column 5, the effect of culture on the extensive and intensive margins is one fifth and one tenth the size of having a college degree, respectively.
23 Our findings are robust to using the country-of-ancestry average remittance controls in addition to the individual-level remittance data.
Robustness Checks
This section explores the robustness of our results to a battery of sensitivity checks, including host-country discrimination and omitted variable bias, selective migration, changes in sample criteria, and alternative specifications.
Host-Country Discrimination and Omitted Variable Bias
One concern is that our results are driven by discrimination in Spain against immigrants from particular countries of ancestry, which happen to have a less developed housing finance housing system. To address this concern, columns 2 and 3 in Tables Another concern is that access to a mortgage may be easier for those immigrants coming from countries of ancestry who are more similar to Spain. To address this concern, we add to our baseline specification a dummy variable indicating whether the country-of-ancestry official language is Spanish (shown in Column 4 in Tables 4.A and 4.B). Again, doing so leaves our key estimates practically unaffected. Alternatively, it may well be that similitude with Spain is not regarding language but economic development. To address this, Column 5 in adds log GDP per capita to the specification in Column 4. By including the log GDP per capita of the country of ancestry, and in Column 5 capture differences in country-ofancestry culture beyond those due to differences in the economic development that may affect an immigrant's mortgage for reasons unrelated to the house financing system in her country of ancestry. To the extent that these differences in economic development also affect the cultural 24 To the extent that differences in religious upbringing can affect the financial development on the country of ancestry (Stulz and Williamson, 2003; and Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales, 2003) , including these variables in the specification will over-control the estimates of the direct effect of culture on the housing finance.
attitude towards mortgage finance, we may well be over-controlling. Column 5 shows little change to our coefficients of interest, and , which remain positive and statistically significant at the 1 percent level. Alternatively, as human capital and economic development are highly correlated, we re-estimate the specification from Column 4 with a variable controlling for the percent of individuals in the country of ancestry older than 15 years old who can read and write (shown in Column 6). Again, doing so has little effect on our main results.
Hence, it does not seem that the culture findings are driven by immigrants' similarity with the Spanish customs, economic or educational development.
Because there is evidence that wealth determines borrowing constraint to financing a house (Barakova et al., 2003) , a final concern is that our results may be driven by systematic wealth differences across immigrants from different ancestries. This is unlikely as we are already controlling for employment status, monthly earnings, education and family structure, among other socio-demographic characteristics. Moreover, we have already seen that controlling for country-of-ancestry GDP per capita has little impact on our main results.
Nonetheless, to address this concern, Column 7 adds an additional proxy for immigrants' wealth prior to emigrating, namely an indicator variable equal to one if the immigrant owned a house in the country of ancestry prior to emigrating, and zero otherwise. Adding this additional control does not change our main finding that culture is related to mortgage financing.
Selective Migration
A common problem in the epidemiological approach is that immigrants may select where to immigrate. To address that immigrants from particular ancestries may choose certain regions in the host country, all of our findings are estimated with province fixed-effect, the finer geographical area available in the ENI. A different type of selection is economically motivated migration. As explained earlier, we already tested the sensitivity of our results to a large set of individual and family characteristics, as well as country-of-ancestry GDP, and doing so had little effect on our coefficients of interest, suggesting that it is unlikely that our results are capturing individual unobserved heterogeneity that is correlated with country-of-ancestry social norms regarding mortgage finance, as opposed to the effects of our culture proxies.
Since the migration decision will be both a function of immigrants unobserved ability and country-of-ancestry as well as host-country distribution of income (Borjas, 1987) , selection bias could still potentially affect our results. To explore this, we follow Osili and Paulson (2008) and add to our preferred specification the country-of-ancestry Gini index, which captures the extent to which the distribution of income among individuals within a country deviates from a perfectly equal distribution (with an index close to 1 being very unequal and an index close to 0 being very equal). Column 2 in Tables 5.A Moving now to the effect of inequality in the country of ancestry on mortgages in Spain, we find that immigrants from countries with greater inequality are more likely to have a mortgage and a greater present value of mortgage payments than those coming from more equal countries. In particular, immigrants who come from countries where the Gini index is onestandard deviation above the mean are 1.11 percentage points (or 6%) more likely to have a mortgage and have 174.7 percentage points (or 9%) higher present value of mortgage payments in Spain.
To further explore whether selection of immigrants is affecting our results, Columns 3 to 6 in Tables 5.A and 5.B re-estimate our preferred specification after dropping a particular group of immigrants, one at a time. Column 3 drops second-generation immigrants whose parents were born in Spain or for whom we lacked their parents' country-of-birth information (representing a total of 538 individuals in our sample). While remains practically unchanged, is now about one third smaller than in our baseline specification? Crucially, both coefficients remain positive and statistically significant, corroborating that culture affects mortgage-finance decisions.
Columns 4, 5 and 6 present estimates of our baseline specification after dropping one of the three main groups of immigrants in Spain, namely Moroccans, Ecuadorians and
Romanians, one at a time (see Rodriguez-Planas and Vegas, 2014, for differences in labor-market and immigration-status assimilation between these three groups in Spain). Even though the size of varies slightly across these sub-samples of immigrants, this is not the case for
. Most importantly, both and remain positive and statistically significant, indicating that our finding that culture matters is not driven by one of these three nationalities.
Alternative Specifications
Column 8 in Tables 4.A and 4.B displays results when using a univariate probit model to estimate the effect of housing-loan penetration on the likelihood of having a mortgage, and a univariate Tobit model with a left-censor limitation at zero to estimate the effect of mortgagedepth on the present value of mortgage payments. 25 Notice that now both estimates are separately estimated. Although the size of and changes as the empirical specification has changed, the main result remains as both estimates remain positive and statistically significant, suggesting that culture matters in explaining the decision of having a mortgage and the amount.
Heterogeneity
Panels A and B in Table 6 education level, but the extent to which it matters differs by whether we are analyzing the intensive or extensive margin. The effect of culture on the extensive margin is twice as large for the low-than the high-education group (low-education is defined as having at most a highschool degree). However, the effect of culture on the intensive margin is about 25% larger for the high-educated group. Similar results emerge when we estimate the effect of culture by the immigrants' occupation skill level (shown in Columns 3 and 4). 26 The finding that the extensive margin effect is larger for the less-educated or lower-skilled immigrants is consistent with findings of Osili and Paulson (2008) and Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2004, 2006) on the immigrants' decision to own stocks. Interestingly, we find that the intensive-margin effect is stronger for the more-educated or higher-skilled immigrants. A possible explanation for this may well be that the borrowing constraints may be affecting the intensive margin for loweducated and low-skilled individuals to a larger extent, especially given the loose lending taking place in Spain and documented in Section 2.
Columns 5 and 6 analyze the effect by whether there are children in the household. We find, again, that the effect of country-of-ancestry culture matters in either case. Nonetheless, the effect on the extensive margin is larger in households with children, although the opposite is true for the intensive margin. Again, it is likely that individuals with children may well have greater borrowing constraints at the intensive margin than those without family responsibilities.
The effect that immigrants with children in the household have stronger culture effects resembles findings from Luttmer and Singhal (2011) on the effects of country-of-ancestry preferences on preferences for redistribution.
Columns 7 and 8 present estimates for second-versus first-generation immigrants, respectively. We find that the extensive effect is larger among first-generation immigrants, and that the opposite is true for the intensive margin. Again, it is likely that borrowing constraints are affecting the intensive margin to a greater extent for first-generation immigrants.
Crucially, the fact that the transmission of beliefs holds even for second-generation immigrants suggests that culture is persistent and may be transmitted through vertical transmission (from parents to children). Like us, Antecol (2000), Fernandez and Fogli (2006) , Giuliano (2004) and Nollenberger, Rodriguez-Planas, and Sevilla (2016) also find evidence that culture persist across generations. In contrast, Osili and Paulson (2008) did not find evidence that countryof-ancestry quality of the institutions affected second-generation immigrants' decision to invest in stocks in the US.
26 High-skilled occupations include professional and technical or executive, and managerial categories. Lowskilled occupations include low-administrative level occupations, handlers, cleaners, or service occupations.
Columns 9 and 10 focus on the differential effect by whether the immigrant is naturalized or permanent resident, or not. Interestingly, the home-country mortgage financing system affects both immigrants who have become citizens or are in the process of being able to become citizens (column 9), and those who have a temporary situation in Spain or are undocumented (column 10). This finding strengthens our results as it shows that the relevance of country-of-ancestry mortgage finance is not driven by undocumented immigrants' greater difficulties to get a mortgage and coming from countries with weaker mortgage financing systems. Moreover, it highlights that the effect of culture persist even among those immigrants who are strongly rooted in the home country (column 9).
Panel B examines the effect of country-of-ancestry mortgage finance by the length of time the immigrant has been in the country (columns 1 and 2), and the age at migration (columns 3 and 4). One would expect the effect of country-of-ancestry culture to fade with tenure in the country. Similarly, one would expect the effect of country-of-ancestry culture to be stronger among those who emigrated as adults as opposed to those who did so as children or adolescents. In either case, we focus on immigrants who are naturalized or permanent residents to mitigate concerns that including undocumented immigrants or those with temporary residence permits is adding noise to our estimates. Columns 1 and 2 shows that the effect of country-of-ancestry mortgage finance is considerably larger for those who have been in the country for 10 years or less. Nonetheless, we continue to find that country-of-ancestry beliefs matter even for the mortgage-finance decisions of those who have been in the country for more than 10 years, suggesting that the effect of culture is very persistent. We also find in columns 3 and 4 that the country-of-ancestry effects are stronger for those who immigrated as adults (measured as 25-year old or older). 27 Having said that, it is important to note that, even among those who immigrated as children or young adults, the effect of culture persist. Findings that the effect of culture diminishes with the time of exposure to country-of-ancestry resemble those of Haliassos et al., 2016 , who find that the effect of culture diminishes with the time of exposure to host-country institutions.
Institutional Channels from the Country of Ancestry Shaping Culture
In this section, we use variables related to a country's strength of the housing finance system, as well as variables reflecting a country's institutional quality as alternative proxies for social norms related to a country's housing finance system. In addition to check the sensitivity of our findings to alternative proxies of culture, comparison of the effects across different measures will provide guidance on which country-of-ancestry informal institutions matter the most for mortgage demand (both at the extensive and intensive margin). To the extent that culture affects institutions and vice-versa (Alesina and Giuliano, forthcoming in Journal of Economic Literature), exploring which institutional channels in the country of ancestry shape the social norms regarding mortgage debt ought to provide some policy guidance.
Tables 7.A and 7.B replicate estimates from equations (1) and (2) but using alternative measures of culture (defined below and in Appendix Table A .1) . Column 1 presents our baseline specification (shown in column 3 in Tables 3.A and 3.B). Column 2 presents the effects of country-of-ancestry property-rights index on the likelihood of having a mortgage (Table 7 .A) and the present value of the mortgage payments (Table 7 .B). This index is obtained from the Index of Economic Freedom and measures the degree to which a country's laws protect private property rights and the degree to which its government enforces those laws. It also assesses the likelihood that private property will be expropriated and analyzes the independence of the judiciary, the existence of corruption within the judiciary, and the ability (1998, 2000) show that greater protection is provided to shareholders in countries with British legal tradition and that financial development is accelerated in these countries." The next two columns present estimates using indices from Warnock and Warnock (2008) . Column 4 uses strength of legal rights index, which measures the degree to which collateral and bankruptcy laws protect the rights of borrowers and lenders and thus facilitate lending. This index ranges from 0 to 10, with higher scores indicating that these laws are better designed to expand access to credit. Column 5 uses the depth-of-creditinformation index instead, which measures rules affecting the scope, accessibility, and quality of credit information available through public or private credit registries. The index ranges from 0 to 6, with higher values indicating the availability of more credit information, from either a public registry or a private bureau, to facilitate lending decisions.
Even though these variables are correlated with each other, as they capture different aspects of culture, they may well have independent power to explain immigrant's mortgage decisions in the host country. 28 While all these variables may reflect, in part, social norms regarding the mortgage finance system; the property rights index may also capture social norms regarding the ability of individuals to accumulate private property, which is secured by clear laws, fully enforced by the state; the English Common Law indicator may also capture social norms on protection given to shareholders and financial development; and the credit information index may also capture social norms on the amount and quality of credit information.
All of the α2 estimates shown in Table 7 .A are positive and statistically significant suggesting that higher reliability in these different institutions in the country of origin is associated with a higher likelihood of having a mortgage among immigrants in the host country.
In particular, if an individual from a country with "average" property rights index had instead come from a country that had the property rights index one-standard deviation above the mean, percent, this represents a 10% increase. As a comparison, this estimate is about one fourth the effect of coming from a country with British legal tradition on the likelihood that immigrants in the US invest in stocks (Osili and Paulson, 2008) .
While social norms regarding legal rights or credit information explain a smaller effect of the decision of having a mortgage, they are far from negligible. A one-percentage point increase in the standard deviation of either of these indices is associated with a 4.46% and a 1.14% increase in the likelihood of having a mortgage in the host country, respectively. This represents one fourth and one fifteenth of the culture effect measured with the housing-loan penetration.
Moving now to the effects of social norms regarding the reliability of institutions on the present value of the mortgage payments. Estimates from Table 7 .B reveal that all but one of the coefficients are positive and statistically significant, again suggesting that higher reliability in these different institutions in the country of origin is associated with a higher present value of mortgage among immigrants in the host country. Table 7 .B shows that the present value of the monthly mortgage payments in the host country is 291 euros (or 16%)
higher for immigrants coming from countries with English Common Law origin than for those coming from countries with different legal tradition. Interestingly, Table 7 .B reveals that social norms on credit information are quite relevant when explaining the present value of monthly mortgage payments. For instance, if an individual from a country with "average" credit information index had instead come from a country that had mortgage depth one-standard deviation above the mean, the present value of his or her monthly mortgage in the host country would have increased by 79.45 euros, a 4.3% increase in the present value monthly mortgage. 30
Social norms regarding legal rights explain about half of this effect. Hence, social norms regarding credit information and legal rights explain one half and one fourth of the effect estimated regarding beliefs on the depth of the mortgage system, respectively. Social norms regarding property rights have no effect on the amount of the mortgage.
Conclusion
This paper explores the role of social norms regarding mortgage debt on individuals' demand for a mortgage and the amount borrowed. Using a nationally representative sample of 12,344
immigrants from 41 different countries of ancestry living in Spain in 2007, we find solid evidence that mortgage culture from the country of ancestry affects immigrants' mortgage demand in the host country both in the extensive and intensive margins. Persistence of these results among second-generation immigrants, naturalized and permanent residents, those with a tenure in the host country greater than ten years, or those who arrived as children or young adults corroborates the relevance of beliefs in shaping individuals behavioral outcomes.
Although we find that the transmission of culture on mortgage finance is stronger in the extensive than the intensive margin, evidence from subgroup analysis seems to suggest that the weaker effect on the extensive margin may be related to borrowing constraints in the host country for certain groups, namely the low-educated individuals, low-skilled workers, those with children in the household, and first-generation immigrants. Interestingly, we find that social norms regarding property rights are most relevant when explaining immigrants' decision to get a mortgage, but those about credit information matter most when explaining the amount of the mortgage, providing insightful information for policy makers. Table 3 .A excluding the country-of-ancestry housing-loan penetration variable). More specifically, we first estimate a linear regression using all covariates in the baseline specification, but the country-of-ancestry housing-loan penetration variable, as RHS variables. We then take the average residual of each country of ancestry resulting from the previous exercise. These residuals are regressed on the country-of-ancestry housing-loan penetration. The regression line has a slope of 0.15 with a standard error of 0.06. The adjusted R 2 is 0.09. The bubbles are weighted by the number of individuals in our sample (without using population weights). Table 3 .B excluding the mortgage depth). More specifically, we first estimate a linear regression using all covariates in the baseline specification, but the country-of-ancestry mortgage depth variable, as RHS variables, conditioning on having a mortgage. We then take the average residual of each country of ancestry resulting from the previous exercise. These residuals are regressed on the country-of-ancestry mortgage depth. The regression line has a slope of 1,387.01 with a standard error of 788.56. The adjusted R 2 is 0.04. The bubbles are weighted by the number of individuals in our sample (without using population weights). Population Size 3,600,099 Notes: About 8.5% of the immigrants do not report education or report it as "don't know." To avoid dropping them from our sample, we code these answers with a dummy variable indicating education is missing Notes: Columns 1 and 2 display the mean likelihood of having a mortgage and the present value of the mortgage by country of ancestry estimated using our sample of immigrants from 2007 ENI. The other columns present country-of-ancestry measures (described in Appendix Population Size 3,600,099 3,600,099 3,600,099 3,600,099 3,600,099 Notes: Results from estimating equations 1 and 2 using seemingly unrelated linear regressions. Each column lists all RHS variables in the specification. Specification in column (3) is our baseline specification. Standard Errors are clustered at the country-of-ancestry level. All estimates are weighted to be representative of the immigrant population in Spain as indicated by ENI. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 Pop. Size 3,600,099 3,600,099 3,600,099 3,600,099 3,600,099 3,600,099 3,600,099 3,600,099 Notes: Results from estimating equations 1 and 2 using seemingly unrelated linear regressions (columns 1 to 7). Column 8 estimates equation 1 using a univariate Probit model. Specification in column (1) is our baseline specification. All other specifications are built from baseline specification plus the RHS variables indicated in each case in the Table. Standard errors are clustered at the country-of-ancestry level. All estimates are weighted to be representative of the immigrant population in Spain as indicated by ENI. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 Pop. Size 3,600,099 3,600,099 3,600,099 3,600,099 3,600,099 3,600,099 3,600,099 3,600,099 Notes: Results from estimating equations 1 and 2 using seemingly unrelated linear regressions (columns 1 to 7). Column 8 estimates equation 1 using a univariate Tobit model with left-censor limitation at zero. Specification in column (1) is our baseline specification. All other specifications are built from baseline specification plus the RHS variables indicated in each case in the Table. Standard errors are clustered at the country-of-ancestry level. All estimates are weighted to be representative of the immigrant population in Spain as indicated by ENI. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 Notes: Results from estimating equations 1 and 2 using seemingly unrelated linear regressions. Specification in column (1) is our baseline specification. Column 2 adds the country-of-ancestry Gini index as an additional RHS variable control. Columns 3 to 6 estimate the baseline specification by dropping second-generation immigrants whose parents were born in Spain of for whom we lacked parents' country-of-birth information (column 3); Moroccans (column 4); Ecuadorians (column 5); or Romanians (column 6). Standard errors are clustered at the country-of-ancestry level. All estimates are weighted to be representative of the immigrant population in Spain as indicated by ENI. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 Pop. Size 3,600,099 3,600,099 3, 496,457 3,124,850 3,260,577 3,190,171 Notes: Results from estimating equations 1 and 2 using seemingly unrelated linear regressions. Specification in column (1) is our baseline specification. Column 2 adds the country-of-ancestry Gini index as an additional RHS variable control. Columns 3 to 6 estimate the baseline specification by dropping second-generation immigrants whose parents were born in Spain of for whom we lacked parents' country-of-birth information (column 3); Moroccans (column 4); Ecuadorians (column 5); or Romanians (column 6). Standard errors are clustered at the country-of-ancestry level. All estimates are weighted to be representative of the immigrant population in Spain as indicated by ENI. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 Results from estimating equations 1 and 2 using seemingly unrelated linear regressions on our baseline specification for different subgroups of immigrants as explained below. Column 1 uses immigrants with at most a high-school degree. Column 2 uses immigrants with college education. Columns 3 and 4 use immigrants working in low-and high-skilled occupations, respectively. High-skilled occupations include professional and technical or executive, and managerial categories. Low-skilled occupations include low-administrative level occupations, handlers, cleaners, or service occupations. Columns 5 and 6 use immigrants without and with children in the household, respectively. Columns 7 and 8 use second-and first-generation immigrants. Second-generation immigrants were born in the host country to immigrant parents, whereas first-generation immigrants were born outside of Spain. Column 9 uses citizens and permanent residents only, and column 10 uses all other immigrants, including undocumented. Standard errors are clustered at the country-of-ancestry level. All estimates are weighted to be representative of the immigrant population in Spain as indicated by ENI. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 Results from estimating equations 1 and 2 using seemingly unrelated linear regressions on our baseline specification for different subgroups of immigrants as explained below. Column 1 and 2 control for age at arrival dummies, and columns 3 and 4 control for years since arrival dummies. All estimates in panel B are restricted to immigrants who reported being naturalized or permanent residents. Column 1 uses immigrants with a tenure in Spain of 10 years or less. Column 2 uses immigrants who have been in Spain for more than 10 years. Columns 3 and 4 use immigrants who arrived to Spain before the age of 25 or after turning 24 years old, respectively. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 Results from estimating equations 1 and 2 using seemingly unrelated linear regressions on our baseline specification. Column 1 is the baseline specification (also shown in Table 3 .A, column 3). Column 2 replaces the country-of-origin housing-loan penetration for the country-of-origin property right index. Column 3 uses an indicator for whether the country of origin had English Common Law tradition, instead. Columns 4 and 5 use the legal right index and the credit information index, respectively, instead of the housing-loan penetration. Standard errors are clustered at the country-of-origin level. All estimates are weighted to be representative of the immigrant population in Spain as indicated by ENI. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 Results from estimating equations 1 and 2 using seemingly unrelated linear regressions on our baseline specification. Column 1 is the baseline specification (also shown in Table 3 .A, column 3). Column 2 replaces the country-of-origin mortgage depth for the country-of-origin property right index. Column 3 uses an indicator for whether the country of origin had English Common Law tradition, instead. Columns 4 and 5 use the legal right index and the credit information index, respectively, instead of the housing-loan penetration. Standard errors are clustered at the country-of-origin level. All estimates are weighted to be representative of the immigrant population in Spain as indicated by ENI. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
